The recent International and European reforms concerning corporate governance and the need for effective capital markets "dictated" a reform in company law and corporate governance regimes in Greece and Cyprus. The latter are both small or medium sized markets, based on family owned companies and banks. Despite the cultural link between the aforesaid countries and their geographical proximity, their approach towards the adoption of corporate governance principles and best practices is not similar and depicts a difference due to historical and political reasons. This paper has two objectives, namely:
Introduction
Corporate governance is a widely discussed issue among academics, financial market regulators, investors and International Organizations. In Europe the discussion is more recent than in the US when was first argued in 1932 by Berle and Means 1 . The Securities Acts of the 1930"s in the US were quite determinative for the function of their capital markets and the reforms that followed until the recent provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 2 . In Europe, corporate governance aspects were involved in the FSAP 3 and in the Company Law Action Plan of 2003 4 as well, but one could find earlier pieces of scale privatisations 6 -to be more attractive to foreign investors and finally, the need for a prompt response to corporate scandals, in Europe too, such as the Parmalat case 7 and other financial fraud scandals in Germany (e.g. Metallgesellschaft) and France 8 . Investor"s confidence still constitutes a key concept in European financial and company law 9 . Many definitions can be found for corporate governance from an economic, legal or business perspective. Shleifer and Vishny 10 define corporate governance as the way in which the "suppliers" of finance to corporations assure adequate returns of their investments. Corporate governance problems arise from the separation of ownership and control, known as agency theory 11 . In line with the OECD principles 12 , corporate governance is only part of the larger economic context in which firms operate, including, for example, macroeconomic policies and the degree of competition in product and factor markets. The corporate governance framework depends also on the legal, regulatory and institutional environment. Factors, such as business ethics and corporate awareness of the environmental and social interests of the communities, in which a company operates, can also have impact on its reputation and its long-term success 13 . Causality between culture and governance is supported by the literature as well 14 . According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, language and culture supplement each one another, the language being the stable factor constraining the development of cultural norms 15 .
Corporate governance has significant implications for economic growth and is evaluated and revised periodically. Legal origin of law leads to a better understanding of the shaping of financial development; however, it does not explain financial development beyond legal origin"s ability to explain cross country variability in legal system adaptability 16 , 17 . The criteria, on which every country bases its corporate governance system, differ for many reasons. The "law and finance" theory 18 has shown legal origin matters and has explained the underdevelopment in many Continental Europe capital markets throughout the 20 th century, as a result of poor investor protection 19 , 20 . The comparison between Greece and Cyprus in this research paper can constitute an example, since both countries are Mediterranean, they are correlated in terms of history and culture, they have medium sized -family-companies usually with one controlling shareholder 21 , as most Continental Europe law countries 22 ; the Greek legislator issued a law on corporate governance whereas, the Cypriot legislator insisted in a "milder" (soft law) solution, based on the revised Code of Corporate Governance 23 . In this paper, both framework of Greece and Cyprus are examined, as a vivid example consisting of two small capital markets with common historical and cultural roots, but with a difference in treating corporate governance regulation. The Greek context provides a recently liberalised principally dominated by family-controlled firms and banks. In the so-called "family-capitalism", the agency problem refers to the conflicting relationship between strong blockholders and minority shareholders 24 , 25 . The Greek legislator made the choice, as of 2002, to proceed with a general principles law concerning corporate governance, mandatory for all companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange (hereinafter called "ASE"), whereas more complicated corporate governance issues were left to be treated either by the company law or by codes and regulations of the ASE or by every listed company at its discretion.
The Cypriot context provides a different approach to corporate governance. Though it is also based on family-owned companies and banks, it treats corporate governance issues through soft law, utilizing the revised Cypriot Code on corporate governance 26 as the main corporate governance tool. The choice of soft law reflects the great influence of Anglo-Saxon corporate principles in the Cypriot regime that has its roots in the history of the island and the close bonds with the legal tradition of the UK. Also in Cyprus, the leniency of the regime is depicted in the formation of the company law and its requirements, especially as regards taxation, since Cyprus economy was basedto a great extent -on the attraction of many off-shore company seats for reasons related to looser taxation 27 . The paper consists of three parts; part I includes the description and the main characteristics of the Greek corporate governance framework; part II includes the description and the main characteristics of the Cypriot corporate governance framework and, finally, part III includes the assessment and the regimes" evaluation. 24 R. Morck, and L. Steier, L, ‗The Global History of Corporate Governance : An Introduction', NBER, (2005), Working paper No. 11062. 25 Apart from the traditional agency theory, emphasis has been put on self -dealing by the literature and the modern theory, where corporate insiders (either controlling shareholders or managers) tend to divert corporate wealth to themselves under the name of ‗ private benefits of control' see S. Dankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, ‗The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing' (2007 revised) Harvard University -Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). 26 Cypriot Corporate Governance Code (2007 revised). 27 Unlike other ‗tax heavens' for off shore companies, Cyprus offers great tax incentives due to its favourable tax regime and its wide network of double tax treaties. Even after the change of tax regime in Cyprus in 2003, as a consequence of the island's accession to the EU, 10% corporate tax still gives Cyprus the lowest rate in EU after Ireland.
Part I 1. Corporate Governance Reforms in Greece 1.1.The Greek legal framework
In Greece, the subject of corporate governance has become the topic of discussion for the last years. As the company law reform proceeded at an international and European level, the same reform became a necessity at a national level too. Greek capital market has experienced many transformations during the last ten years.
The Greek capital market came across a major crisis at the end of 1999, when the massive entrance of individual and institutional investors increased abnormally and rapidly the stock prices and the liquidity. Many short-term speculative placements were effected at that time and the result was a significant divergence between actual and equilibrium prices. The Greek stock market crisis generated a reform of Greek Companies and capital markets law that led to: (i) the adoption of Law 3016/2002 (hereinafter the "Act") 28 , a codifying law of the partially adopted corporate governance principles in Greece that regulates the corporate governance of financial institutions and applies in parallel with the general framework set by the Act.
The new corporate governance framework in Greece is mainly focused on protecting individual and minority shareholders" interests that could not affect the company"s decisions significantly 31 . HCMC is the main regulatory authority of the Greek capital market and is responsible for supervising the implementation of rules and acts in this market. It 32 . According to this law, the General Assembly of shareholders is the decisive body in the company. A unitary board structure is applied and the shareholders elect directly the directors through the shareholders" General Assembly 33 . The Board holds both supervisory and managerial powers, while the executive managers are dealing with the every day agenda. The Board consists of -at least -three members and as regards the listed companies, at least 1/3 of the total number of Directors must be non-executive ones, while at least two of them must be independent. The Greek legislation, as of decree 4237/1962 regarding limited companies, has not changed significantly until the present date, except for the adoption of European directives and regulations that regulate specific matters and do not result in a general reform of the company law framework.
According to the new Law 3604/2007 on Limited Companies 34 , the most important changes involve the following:  the reduction of the State"s interference in the launch and functioning of Limited Companies;  the enhancement of shareholders" role;  the simplification of the procedure for statutory amendments;  issues concerning the creation and functioning of Limited Companies, as well as the business environment;  transitory clauses; 35 For many years corporate governance and its provisions consisted a terra incognita for Greece. It is true that the Greek capital market is small and has no significant tradition in trading to exhibit 36 . 36 The Athens Stock Exchange was created in 1876 and constituted an independent public entity. It was ruled by the Laws 3632/1928 and 1806/1988. In 1995, it became a limited company with single shareholder the Greek state. By the 1999 as it was partially privatized the Greek States capital shares were restricted in the total amount of 47,75%. The total privatization of the ASE was completed in 2003 and the same year the adoption of the Law 3152/2003 defined the new legal framework of Regulated Markets in Greece. The majority of the administrative powers are transferred to the Hellenic Capital Market Commission was established in 1876 but its contribution to the Greek economy actually started late 1990"s. It contributed significantly to the development of Greek economy, especially during the last years; however, a benchmark, as compared to the international regulations for organized trading markets and a corporate governance regime is difficult to be adopted as far as Greece is concerned.
Given that the ASE was hit by the "1999 bubble", coming as a consequence of the international stock market crisis that affected almost every regulated trading market, it became more than evident that Greek capital market was unprepared in dealing with issues involving trading, market abuse actions and corporate governance. At that time the HCMC issued Decision no. 5/204/14-11-2000 applicable to all ASE listed companies 37 . The decision"s main purpose was to introduce and, rather, enforce specific rules related to the composition of the Board of Directors, the executive management and the external auditors of the companies listed to ASE. Furthermore, the decision included several obligations for the disclosure regime of the companies" and related parties" transactions that can or could affect share price, since all companies" decisions should be released to the public 38 .HCMC recently issued a circular concerning details for the proper and timely release of companies financial provisions as an addendum to its Decision no. 3/347/12.7.2005 concerning the release of inside information 39 . In general, the Greek legal framework consists of laws and rules of the HCMC.
The Corporate Governance Act is the law introducing effective corporate governance mechanisms 40 37 It consists of a code of conduct that set behaviour standards for ASE listed companies, specified obligations of main company's shareholders, the executive management and every other individual or entity connected to them. Articles of this code of conduct are elaborated by the Law 3016/2002 and from time to time amended by the HCMC, its core principles however are still in effect and it consists a necessary tool for the application of corporate governance regime in Greece. 38 For example, the appointment or dismissal of a director, the strategic decision to invest in a foreign country, the acquisition or disposal of a subsidiary etc. 39 Greek corporate governance is much more precise nowadays, yet amendments have to be made. The mandatory rules of the Act set the ground for the sound performance of the listed companies, whilst many corporate matters are regulated by the companies themselves. The Act has introduced the independent non-executive members of the BoD, however it was criticized for not requiring the disclosure of business and management risks by the company and also, for not enhancing shareholders" participation to general meetings 43 .
The correlation of laws 3016/2002 and 2190/1920 (now 3604/2007)
The appropriate function of the Greek capital market is based on a series of laws and decisions made by the competent authorities. In their majority, these laws and decisions transfer and apply to the Greek framework directives and rulings concerning the crucial topics of corporate governance and the optimal efficiency of capital market"s function. Prior to the issuance of both The Act"s provisions are implemented in every issuer listed in the ASE without regard to the law applicable to the listed company. There is though controversy on whether the said legislation should be finally applicable to foreign issuers, since a noncompatibility of the Act with the companies law systems of their countries of origin could arise; for instance, in case of company law providing for a twotier system. From the European law perspective, equal treatment problems could arise with the Act, at least when foreign issuers are admitted to the ASE 45 . This 44 It was evident from the code of 1999 that a binding regulation should follow as it contained many recommendations of optimal practices in corporate governance that could result in a formal regulation of corporate governance principles. 45 The implementation of the Act to foreign listed in ASE companies raises some practical issues. is a controversial matter that the legislator chose not to touch, but should be reconsidered in a future review. The Greek legislator will probably proceed with the mitigation of certain mandatory rules allowing for wider margins of self-regulation and adopting, in the meantime, the application of the "comply or explain" rule for corporate governance structures and practices. In other words, the market environment is favourable to opt self -regulation and, in this sense, the adoption of voluntary regulations can be proved beneficial in several ways 46 . The provisions of the Act are not obligatory for the non-listed Greek limited companies. However, this fact doesn"t impede any company from voluntarily complying with it, in order to create a more efficient corporate environment for its function and maximize the company"s value.
The Act encompasses the effort of the Greek legislator to introduce mandatory corporate governance rules, in order to improve the daily company management function, the market Commission shall be informed of such measures at the earliest opportunity". However, the act 3016/2002 does not refer to the case of conflicting issues with the legislation of other non-European-foreign issuers and the applicable law in conflict. On the contrary, the German code for Corporate Governance declares that no provision is implemented in any foreign issuer whereas the American legislation provides that it is implemented in foreign issuers listed in American stock markets thus having extraterritorial effects. 46 Corporate governance codes can be proved beneficial according to Tsibanoulis in the ways that: stimulate public discussion upon corporate governance issues, encourage companies to adopt widely-accepted corporate governance standards, explain to investors the rules of law and the selfregulated practices, they can be used as standards to evaluate the supervisory and management bodies and they can help prepare the ground for changes in securities regulation and company law where these changes are necessary, see D. Tsibanoulis, ‗Corporate Governance Developments in Greece' available at : www.unece.org/ie/wp8/documents/corpgov/tsibanoulis_corp gov.pdf. transparency and integrity and to enhance investors" confidence in the capital market.
3. The articles of the Act in brief
The Basic rules that the Act introduced in Greece are as follows: i.
the scope of the new act is to enhance shareholders" rights and maximize the value of their shares 47 . According to the Act, it is crucial that "every member of the board of directors or any other third person pursues the best interest of the company, whilst being obliged to disclose any kind of conflicting interest between them and the company'. ii.
At least one third of the Members of the Board of Directors of the listed companies should be non-executive and two of them should be independent. However, if representatives of the minority participate in the Board of Directors, then the number of independent non-executive members can change. iii.
Listed companies are expected to abide to an internal control regulation following a board decision that should include the provisions of article 6 of the Act. iv.
Listed companies should create an internal control body mechanism in order to adopt the provisions of article 8 of the Act. v.
In the case of a share capital increase of listed companies, the Board of Directors shall submit a report to the General Assembly including the general directions of the investment plan of the company, an indicative time schedule for the realization of the plan and a statement including the use made of the capital deriving from the previous share capital increase. The above legislative measures constitute ius cogens and cannot be modified by self-regulating codes of corporate governance or other selfregulations adopted by the listed companies.
The competent authority to impose administrative sanctions is the HCMC 48 .
Board duties
The Corporate Governance Act consists of 11 articles. . It affects every company listed in the Greek regulated trading market, i.e. the ASE.
The Board of Director"s duties are described in articles 2-5. Article 2 of the act specifies the fiduciary duties of the management and the board members in the company 50 . Board members are prohibited from pursuing their own interests at the expense of the company company"s interest, which they should promote continuously. In any case of a conflict of interest , the board members are obliged to assure the "well-being" of the company and to disclose to the remaining board members the conflicting interests with the company or even with the rest board members. It is also provided that the board members make decisions about the general remuneration system in the company, especially for the remuneration of managers and internal control executives. The legislator places particular emphasis on the regulation of conflicting interests between the board and the company. This can be explained by the peculiarities met in the Greek capital market regime and the companies listed in Greece. Most of these Companies are family-companies that were transformed into public ones and are still controlled by a small number of controlling shareholders (one or two). Consequently, the boards of listed companies are formed by members that, either belong to the main shareholders, or are in a close connection to them (relatives). These members, despite their special relation, are expected by the Greek legislator to promote the company"s interests, rather than their own 51 .
The duties of the board members are not exclusively specified in article 2 and, if non regulated, a recourse to the general principle of the fiduciary duty of the board members is made.
Board Members
The Act distinguishes between executive, nonexecutive and independent members of the board 52 . It 49 According to the recommendatory report of the law, the discrimination between corporate and financial law of the provisions of the act is not very facile to be adopted, see can guarantee more independence in the boards. However, it is difficult to measure the degree of independence. The Act foresees the factors determining a dependence relation and by that provision one can infer which are the independency"s criteria. A close friendly relationship with the controlling shareholder(s) of the companyespecially in family companies-could actually exclude independence.
Remuneration of the board members
The remuneration of directors, either executive or nonexecutive is one of the most debated issues in 53 corporate governance 54 . The Law 2190/1920 provides that remuneration must be proportionate to the time the members devote to board meetings and to the accomplishment of duties delegated to them. Articles 3 and 5 of the Act provide that the remuneration system of directors and top executives, in general, is described in 43a of Law 2190/1920, and that it is proportionate to the time the members dedicate in company related issues. It is of great importance to institutional investors that the board members are compensated in a way that aligns their interests with those of the company they run 55 . Article 5 of the Act strikes out the difference in the compensation of non-executive members. This difference is justified by the corporate governance theory, because the nature of responsibilities of non-executive board members differs. A major duty of the non-executive members is to control the decisions of executive members 56 . In order to complete an efficient control of the executives" resolutions, it is anticipated that the compensation of non-executive board members is not affected by the executive ones. With regard to Law 2190/1920, the General Assembly makes decisions about the remuneration of executive, non-executive and independent board members 57 .No distinction is made as to the nature of compensation. The criteria taken into account for the compensation are the following:
 the time devoted in the affairs of the company  the fulfilment of their responsibilities, according to the statute of the company, the board and the law Directors remuneration must also be disclosed in the annex of the annual financial statements for each separately 58 . The Act provides that the total amount of remuneration or any other form of payment should be reported separately in the Annex of the annual financial statements 59 . However, it failed to follow the UK example 60 director"s remuneration concerning detailed disclosure of information on director"s remuneration and statement incorporated in the Annual report 62 .
Internal control mechanismsArticles 6-8 of the Act
Articles 6-8 of the Act foresee the minimum requirements of the internal control system that should be adopted in every listed company in the Greek regulated trading market. The Act specifies both the method to organize the internal control system of the company and the responsibilities of the internal audit control department. These provisions had already been anticipated by Decision 5/204/2000of the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC); however with the corporate governance Act they became binding for all listed companies. The Board of Directors is responsible for the formation and the supervision of internal control mechanism of the company. The relevant system consists of an internal function regulation (art. 6), the organization of internal control services in the company (art. 7) and the fundamental responsibilities thereof (art. 8). The Act points out the need for the adoption of an internal control system in the company, as well as its vital role in the efficacy of the company"s function. This is already acknowledged internationally, since one of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 primary aims is the improvement of internal control mechanisms and the publication of financial statements of the company in a way that accurately describes so as to depict its financial conditions and enhances investors" confidence in the company 63 . Moreover, the UK Combined Code identifies an internal control mechanism broader than the one provided by Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, to the extent that every aspect of risk management is included in order to assure the protection of the shareholders" investment and the company"s capital 64 . Even more so, the Financial Securities Authority (FSA) according to para. 12.43A of its Listing Rules, imposes to the listed companies the duty to comply with the principles of the Combined Code or else to explain the reasons for 61 66 . With respect to the Act, internal audit department (or service) in the company listed in the ASE is compulsory. This service must employ at least one professionally competent in this area person. The internal controllers must be independent and are supervised by one up to three non-executive members of the BoD. This implies the creation of an Internal Control Committee consisting of the board members responsible for the supervision of the internal control procedure. However, the Act does not clearly requires the creation of a similar committee. Neither the Act foresees the exact number and type of board members that should join this committee (non-executive only or also independent ?) and it does not provide for its supervisory responsibilities and authorities 67 . As to the internal auditors, the Act states that they are appointed by the board and that they can request all information relevant for the performance of their duties, such as the books of the company, documentation, banking accounts or portfolios and that they must have free access to any service of the company. The board should always cooperate with the internal auditors and facilitate their research in every possible manner.
Article 6 of the Act specifically requires listed companies and companies planning to go public to adopt an internal regulation 68 . The board is the competent body for adoption of an internal regulation 69 . Every member of the company"s bodies and staff 65 In the UK, the principles concerning internal control were elaborated by the report of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England &Wales : Internal Control, Guidance for the Directors on the Combined Code, 1999 (Turnbull Report 69 The HCMC can grant some exceptions of mandatory adoption of internal regulation for companies that are listed or about to list in a regulated market. Till today this kind of has to implement its rules 70 . The content of the internal regulation must be appropriate for the realization of the company"s aims. This provision offers an example of " quasi intermediate" selfregulation, because the Act generally provides for the adoption of an internal regulation, the content of which has to be specified for each company according to its needs.
In American legislation, the internal audit system design and procedure is Sarbanes-Oxley Act"s primary target. In the Greek legal framework the provision for internal audit design is also a fundamental priority. Sarbanes-Oxley Act in articles 302 (a) (4) (A) and 404 imposes to the management the assessment of the internal control regime of the company 71 . The Greek Act does not explicitly provide for an assessment of internal control system design, however a similar duty can be inferred by the rules on directors liability and other provisions of the Act. In addition, the Greek firms which are cross-listed to NYSE or NASDAQ include in their 20-F form a management"s assessment over reporting the internal control of the company and thus extraterritorially implementing article 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act"s requirements for foreign issuers.
The internal audit control is based on two principles. The first principle consists in the contribution to the company"s management. The system of internal control is a means that assists and improves the efficiency of the company function and its financial results. As a consequence, the BoD is the sole responsible body for hiring or dismissing internal auditors 72 . The second principle highlights the independence of internal auditors; their responsibility is based on their contractual relation with the company 73 . The company must inform the HCMC for every change in the persons or the internal control system within a ten-day period after the aforesaid change 74 . The Act does not imposes the adoption of an audit exception has never been granted by the HCMC, see Tountopoulos in Perrakis as in ftn.13 70 In the case of violation of the internal control rulings of the BoD members or the company bodies' members there is provision for civil responsibility according to art. 22a of Law 2190/1920 as amended by the art. 30 of the Law 3604/2007. 71 The ongoing monitoring of internal control is envisaged in the art. 32 and 33 of the UK Turnbull Report, in the Basel Committee On Banking Supervision, Framework for internal control systems in banking organizations, 1998 , principles 10 and 13 , as it was revised in July 2006 and for US the SEC, Final Release, 14 Rule 15d-15 ( c) Securities and Exchange Act. In Greece, the decision 2438/1998 of the Governor of Bank of Greece contains a provision for the completed assessment of the internal control system of banking institutions by external auditors every three years and the submission of the assessment report in the Bank of Greece. 72 There can be an exception though for the companies that are state controlled and for the internal auditors decides the general assembly as described in art. 26 In Greece, in order to eliminate business risks, the internal control mechanisms lies in the BoD, thus, prohibiting the participation of any other body or corporate officer in the business risk management procedures. The BoD, or its audit committee, should be responsible for the determination of business risk management procedures, while management should be responsible for the daily implementation of it. Until recently only financial institutions were obliged to establish a business risk management unit and determine their internal controls procedures. The same is proposed to every listed company, since this is the best practice that can result in the early identification of potential risks and the accurate evaluation of the company"s performance.
HCMC acquires general sanction authority 77
The ultimate objective of the HCMC is the integrity of the market and the investor protection through transparency and enhanced disclosure. In the framework of article 10 of the Act, HCMC is competent to impose the sanctions described in art. 1 para. 4b of Law 2836/2000 in case a member of the BoD or anyone exercising similar powers does not abide by the rules of articles 3 to 8 and 11 of the Act. The HCMC is also responsible for any violations of the rules by financial institutions even though these are supervised by the Bank of Greece 78 . The HCMC must run off its control in order to ascertain the violation of the articles of the Act with and/or without prior notice by the interested parties. Having the violation been detected, the HCMC can either impose administrative fines or decide the suspension of trading of financial 
Enhancement of the shareholders΄ role in recent law 3604/2007
Attention should be drawn to the enhanced role of the shareholders in the new law on limited companies. The enhancement of their role motivates more investments in Greek capital markets and protects investors' confidence. The shareholders' minorities were not equally treated by Law 2190/1920. As a result, it was really important to improve their position in the company. On the other hand, this improvement could not be radical. Consequently, the reform of minority rights of the new law is not as intensive as one would expect. Indeed, no new right was added to the minority right's list of the article 29 of Law 2190/1920, except for the right to add a new topic in the daily agenda, that was already being implemented through the case law. Furthermore, the percentage for the execution of minority rights was reduced from 1/3 to 1/5 and the right to information that could be could be exercised by the 1/20 of the shareholders became personal in which case each shareholder can separately ask for it. New are also the options for board election under voting paper (ballot), lower percentages for the cancellation of a general meeting's decision and the minority shareholders' right to ask for the dissolution of the company or the buying out of its shares in certain cases by the company (to the exclusion of listed companies) or the majority shareholder. Finally, the new law adopts a mechanism of opt-in / opt -out for certain provisions of articles of association. It is difficult to assess the impact of the new law on Greek corporate governance a short time after its adoption. However, the law is expected to enhance, and simultaneously, loosen up the minority shareholders' position in the company rather than tie it up through strictly regulated provisions.
Compliance with the European and International framework of corporate governance
The actual framework of corporate governance in Greece is in compliance with the European directives and regulations. The Act (as analyzed above) and the implementation of the market abuse directive, the transparency directive, while the takeovers related directive becomes the "umbrella" under which corporate governance is exercised in Greece. The said HCMC΄s decision -when first introducedincorporated many of the 1999 OECD principles 80 as well and enabled the compliance with the international framework on corporate governance practices too.
Yet, there is much discussion on whether the Greek company law regime is as mature as those in the US and the UK. Despite being harmonized to European standards, Greek company law is not as strict as its US counter. This can be partly explained by differences in the securities markets, including the participation of institutional investors and, also, by the difference in corporate governance. The crisis of 1999 led to a more strict regulation by law 3016/2002 leaving some space for self-regulation. Topics not addressed by the legislator either because they were difficult to deal with or premature to be addressed can be covered by codes of good practices 81 and self- 81 On the contrary, the efficiency of good practices of corporate governance and their benchmark role is being questioned in the research paper of S. Turnbull, ‗Correcting regulation, leaving companies free to choose. The practice of "laissez-faire" in corporate governance has become popular amongst practitioners and academics and consequently, it is followed by legislators. 82 . Once a mandatory corporate governance framework is in place in every developed country including Greece, the need for detailed regulation is less apparent. The "comply or explain" principle applicable to companies listed on the LSE might be the right solution also for companies listed on the ASE, in order to improve their corporate governance and to maximize shareholders" value. This principle could lead companies to offer a more stable corporate environment by implementing accepted corporate governance practices.
It is worth to mention though, a shift of the traditional continental law in the Greek binding legal framework for corporate governance that is revealed  The corporate governance code used by the firm or voluntarily applied by it  The international corporate governance practices that the firm follows apart from the mandatory Greek laws  A clear description of the system of internal control mechanisms adopted by the firm and the risk management procedures  The composition and the function of the BoD and every other committee active in the firm In the same paragraph however, it is provided that the firm can comply with the rule or explain and justify the reasons it is applying a different code of corporate governance or whether chooses the application of different corporate governance practices. The novelty in the Greek framework is the mandatory provision for the filing of the annual corporate governance report and the "comply or explain" provision in the Greek legal text. The turmoil of 2009 and the corporate governance failure in the way BoDs function has awaken the Greek legislator, who, however, keeps two paces; in one hand he makes binding provisions and in the other hand, he tries to eliminate the mandatory weight by introducing the comply or explain rule. Nevertheless, this approach is indicative of a more convergent and flexible national regime regarding the international implications of corporate governance. 89 . It is widely known that the Cypriot legal system draws on Common Law heritage. As a consequence, English Common Law and equity principles play a vital role in the securities trading field and operate as a benchmark for the corporate governance principles of the new CCGC.
The CCGC aims at enhancing the supervisory role of the BoD in listed companies, protecting their minority shareholders, adopting transparency and prompt disclosure of information and improving the level of independency in the BoD"s decisions
90
. Furthermore, the adoption of procedures of corporate governance compliance (like the application of compliance indexes) by IPO, firms and their monitoring by institutional investors, will result in the listed companies compliance with internationally accepted principles. The Code provides for the establishment of three committees by the BoD:
i. the Nomination Committee ii.
the Remuneration Committee and iii.
the Audit Committee. Companies are not precluded from establishing other committees voluntarily. The tasks of every BoD committee should be specified in the annual corporate 85 Only the four banks listed in the Cyprus Stock Exchange were voluntarily implementing corporate governance principles until the mandatory implementation of the Central Bank of Cyprus' Directive. 86 Directors" remuneration iii.
Responsibility and Audit Control and iv.
Shareholders" relations The Code"s three annexes deal with: i.
The Remuneration policy, ii.
The disclosure of BoD members" remuneration and iii.
Share-based remuneration
2.2.The articles of the Corporate
Governance Code of Cyprus (CGCC) in brief 2.2.1. BoD and its responsibilities a. The BoD
The Board of Directors (BoD) must meet periodically and at least six times per year. It makes decisions on its official agenda and it is the only body to decide about the topics included in the agenda. It is important for the BoD to include a balance between executive and non-executive and independent directors. The nonexecutive independent members must be half (50%) of the BoD members in all companies listed in the CSE, excluding its Chairman
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. If a company fails to meet this provision, then it should explain the reason for non-compliance 92 in the second part of its annual report At first, this provision caused the reaction of Cypriot based financial institutions, since the BoD of main Cypriot banks had to change. BoD must also disclose the names of the independent non-executive directors and nominate one of them as lead independent non-executive member assigned to be in direct contact with the shareholders.
The role of CEO and of Chairman of the Board should be separate. Otherwise, a justification should be published in the annual report. For the effectiveness of its duties, it is essential that the BoD receive accurate, prompt and full information about the company. It is expected that BoD members dedicate the appropriate time to be informed and the Chairman assures the proper information of his directors.
The role of the BoD is heavily stressed in the aforementioned Central Bank of Cyprus Directive on corporate governance and internal control, as the Board becomes ultimately responsible for the operations and the financial soundness of banks. The fiduciary duties of the Board towards the banking corporation and their shareholders are a proper way of enhancing the banks" corporate governance.
b. Nomination Committee
The BoD should form a Nomination Committee that should be comprised of independent non-executive 91 For companies that are not listed in the CSE main market it is expected that one third of the BoD members are non executive and at least two of them should be independent. 92 Article A.2.3. of the CCGC. members of the BoD. There must be a transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors. The CCGC requires all directors to submit themselves for re-election at least every three years. The nonexecutive directors should be appointed for a specific term and their appointment must not be automatic.
For the nomination of new members of the board, the nomination committee should assess their knowledge, experience, integrity and personality. However, in Cyprus many companies are family owned-like in Greece-and most members of the BoD are members of the family of the main shareholder of the company. The CCGC permits the Chairman of the Nomination Committee to be also the Chairman of the BoD. The fact that the code permits the above and taking into account that the Chairman and the CEO are often the same person in Cyprus, the practical result is a closely controlled board 93 .
Remuneration policy of BoD members and disclosure
According to the CCGC, companies must adopt official and transparent procedures for the remuneration policy of directors. In view of avoiding any potential conflict, the BoD should establish a Remuneration Committee, to consist exclusively of non-executive directors that will be involved in the remuneration policy schemes. The majority of the members of the Remuneration Committee must be independent 94 . Every year a remuneration report of the BoD is disclosed to the shareholders, which should also include the names of the members of the Remuneration Committee. During the annual meetings, the shareholders should approve the remuneration packages. However, as it is noted 95 , while this appears to be an effective control, the shareholders rarely ask for the remuneration policy. Moreover, compensation might be low, but other fringe benefits could be granted without being disclosed to the public. 96 . As in almost all corporate governance codes, the remuneration packages must be sufficient in order to attract experienced directors willing to devote time and knowledge to the company"s supervision. The remuneration policy according to CCGC is closely linked to the company"s efficiency and directors" performance. According to Ferrarini and Moloney however, there are limits to the amount of remuneration, which can be linked to company performance and in, particular, share 93 See supra ftn. 50. 94 As shown in Krambia-Kapardi and -Psaros paper, in a research of 2002, 86% of companies had a normally constituted remuneration committee, every remuneration committee had a majority of non-executive directors and 44% were comprised only by independent members, supra ftn. 50, pp. 135. 95 See Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, supra ftn. 50, pp. 130. 96 E.g. a family member of a director appointed to the company with a high salary etc.
performance, as difficulties arise with risk allocation 97 . With respect to this, the Remuneration Committee is responsible for compensation packages which should not be set at excessive levels and should always reflect company"s performance
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. In case there is clear connection of the compensation of executive members to the company"s performance, executives" interests are aligned with those of shareholders. The CCGC contemplates share options for executive directors requiring however an approval of the shareholders" meeting.
The BoD is required to disclose its remuneration policy. Directors" remuneration is disclosed divided into groups of £50,000 (total remuneration and number of directors by category). The BoD is expected to annually disclose a report of remuneration to the shareholders of the company. It is either a part of the annual report of the company or it is attached to it. The context of the remuneration report is described in full in Annex 1 of the CCGC and involves the disclosure of the remuneration policy for executive members of BoD, in general, and for CEO" s (in case they are not members of the BoD ).
Audit Control a. Internal audit control
The CCGC includes provisions for establishing an internal control department in the company. Other than Greek law, the CCGC works on "a comply or explain" basis. Therefore companies which are not bound to create such a department should explain in their annual report why they did not comply -if this is the case -with this provision. In particular, those companies, which are listed on the Cyprus Stock Exchange (hereinafter "CSE") and do not establish such a department, are expected to give assurances that, as regards internal control matters, they are based on outsourcing by external internationally reputed auditing firms. The CCGC, in this case, seems more lenient than the Greek Act, but practically if a company is listed on CSE, then it is supposed to establish an internal control department or to search for outsourcing. The result is that in both cases there must be a control of the audit procedures, whereas in Cyprus is given the additional option of "outsourcing of control". In any case and according to international practices for good corporate governance, the internal control is one of the most essential -and widely discussed-topics in corporate governance especially after the accounting scandals 99 and there should be notification of who supervises the internal control in each firm. In the CCGC, there is a provision similar to articles 302 and 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, since the BoD in its annual report on corporate governance should confirm that is not aware of any company"s breach of the Securities Law and Regulations of Cyprus. Furthermore, the CCGC impedes external auditors to offer services of internal control in the same company. In case they offer other services and external auditing, then a confirmation of their independency and objectivity must be included in the annual report. Similarly, every loan granted to managers and executives of the company or to their relatives related up to first degree with them 100 must be disclosed in the annual corporate governance report.
b. BoD audit committee
The Board should appoint an Audit Committee with at least two non-executive members. The Chairman of the committee should have an accounting or finance background and the committee must meet at least twice per year. Their duties include the supervision of auditors and its cost effectiveness, their independency and good practices in the company. The Audit Committee can report to the BoD for every accounting policy, the compensation of auditors, their duties and their effectiveness, as well as the preparation of the Corporate Governance report included in the Annual report of the company, confirming the compliance with the code or explaining any deviation from it. It should be noted and is very interesting that the CCGC provides also for a corporate governance officer who ensures the compliance with the CCGC requirements.
Shareholders' relations
In its fourth part, the Code provides for the enhancement of the role of shareholders in the general meetings and requires their stimulation in order to participate more vividly and permanently in them. Article D.1.4 provides that there should be given a wide explanation to shareholders for the sudden discussion of subjects not included in the agenda and there should be much time left to them before the meetings in order to consider over the agenda and proceed to the meeting well informed. Shareholders up to 5% of the share capital can request the inscription of a topic in the general assembly"s agenda at least ten days prior to its taking place.
BoD members and managers are obliged to promptly disclose through the Annual report and the financial statements of the company to the BoD and the shareholders for every individual interest and conflict with the company. The shareholders must also be notified on every possible takeover bid, for its consequence and their rights. An investor liaison officer is appointed by the BoD as the link of the shareholders to the BoD. In every possible change, individual and institutional investors must be immediately notified. Changes to be disclosed to shareholders are:
-The company"s financial statements -Scope and activities of the company in case of a modification -Main shareholders and voting rights -Potential Risks -Employees and shareholders changes -Structure of the governance and policies -Non-usual transactions of the company.
Annual report of Corporate Governance
Listed companies must include in their annual report, a special report of the BoD for corporate governance issues. In the first part of the report the company complies with the CCGC and explains how it applies its principles. In the second part of the report, the company must reassure that it has applied the CCGC" s provisions or else it must explain the reason for noncompliance ('comply or explain rule')
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. This depicts the great influence of the UK"s corporate governance regime in forming the Cypriot framework. The provision is identical to the prerequisites by the LSE rule 12.43A for companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. The report of corporate governance is also an influence of the American Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 that requires the management to assess practices of good corporate governance, specifically about the financial statements and verify them. A crucial difference, however, is that the Cypriot regime is voluntary and consists of soft law, whereas American law is mandatory for all listed companies. This can be explained by the size of the market and the disperse ownership of the capital, as well as by the different history of the company law and the maturity level of the market.
Eventually, it is the BoD"s responsibility to control the good corporate governance practices in the company and the application of the CCGC principles. In this way, transparency and disclosure can strengthen the relationship between the BoD and the shareholders and, consequently, regain investors" confidence in the company.
Part III 3. Assessment of the regimes
The two regimes have many elements in common though they stem from different regulatory nature. The Greek framework better reflects the continental European corporate governance model to the extent that the fundamental principles of good corporate governance are fixed through mandatory provisions. On the contrary, the Cypriot regime is more 101 As discussed in the paper of Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 71% of the listed in Cyprus Stock exchange companies in 2002 did not comply with the Code nor expressed their intention to comply with it, see supra ftn.50 representative of the Anglo-Saxon tradition including the adoption of soft law through a corporate governance code. No doubt, in the last few years many reforms 102 occurred in major European countries concerning corporate governance. However, these reforms imported into regulation already existing principles of corporate governance included in codes and described by widely accepted practices. In the U.S. and for a long time period -i.e., as of the introduction of the 1930"s securities Acts until the last reform of securities regulation by Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 -central government has played a much more important role in regulating corporate governance. The effectiveness of the American securities regulation system is ensured by an aggressive set of enforcement institutions, such as the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), the US Department of Justice and the securities plaintiff bar 103 . US private enforcement through class actions is a policy not common in Europe since, until recently, talking about private law remedies, as deterrent tools, was a taboo in many legal circles 104 . Even the more so, according to Hopt, the right instruments and appropriate sanctions are useless without enforcement 105 . Questions are raised concerning the choice between self-regulation and enforcement and the use of class actions as they exist already in some member states, while in others investors and their associations bring action under specific circumstances. However, in Europe enforcement lies in the hands of member-states, which are traditionally far from strict public enforcement in cases of violations of companies and securities laws.
One could find similarities between the Greek traditional company framework and French law. Managerial power has historically been concentrated in the hands of the CEO, who usually acted as a Chairman of the BoD and in most family owned companies was the dominant shareholder or the owner. Despite its similarities to the French regime, however, Greek law did not provide enough protection for the minority shareholders. The Act and the new law 3604/2007 about limited companies made an effort to bridge this gap and enhance shareholders" role in the 102 So many were the introductions of new directives that it is considered that financial markets suffer from regulatory fatigue and Brussels is widely seen as the source of trouble and complaints about ever-increasing compliance costs, see K. Lannoo company. This is a consequence of the mass intrusion of foreign institutional investors to ASE 106 and the wider opening of the Greek capital market during the last five years.
In both economies of Greece and Cyprus, medium-sized family companies are representative of the market"s participants. On average, it is sometimes argued 107 that family controlled firms can often be better managed than widely held ones 108 . However, this does not imply that family owned companies are always better governed, but it could signify a higher assurance for shareholders" interests protection against managerial abuses. But when better management is linked only to maximization of the firm value and not to the protection of shareholders" interests, then there is evidence that the firm lacks fundamental corporate governance mechanisms. In fact, in Greece and Cyprus corporate governance was not acknowledged as a necessary practice until recently, following the stock market crises of the years 1999-2000 and the European need for a reform of the company law. Consequently, with the openness of the markets, especially to foreign institutional investors and the movement of capital in EU level, the framework had to be regulated. Even more importantly, after the current financial crisis of 2009, that has been partially attributed to corporate governance failure, the corporate governance framework is under serious re-regulation.
Corporate practices in Cyprus reflect a nonbinding regime but rather fully adjusted to the international best practices of corporate governance. Although Cyprus is a small country and its stock market is new, it was triggered by a crisis through the years 1999-2000, similar to the Greek bubble and similar to the one that had triggered most of the international stock markets. Cyprus did not have a framework for corporate governance, but immediately after the crisis issued the CCGC after detailed negotiations with the market operators and taking into consideration the widespread principles of good corporate governance. Its Anglo-Saxon orientation led to the acquisition of a code, rather than a law, and left to companies the initiative to comply with the Code or explain the reason for non-compliance. One could make the assumption that the Cypriot framework is mature and that the capital market is efficient enough, thus, not restricting companies through mandatory rules; but this is not the case. Corporate governance in Cyprus is not mature enough because it is newly implemented and also because the capital market is rather new and medium-sized. The Cypriot market might not be mature and its corporate governance not very detailed but has responded promptly to the need of a construction of a safe corporate environment. So, Cyprus could be rated as more liberal in comparison to other countries and to Greece as well, because it avoided excessive regulatory provisions that do not maximize market values.
On the other hand, Greek legislator preferred to adopt a rather general but binding framework for corporate governance in all listed companies, reflecting no confidence in the market players and in initiatives of self-regulation that could achieve better governance. The choice of the Greek legislator is also explained by the company"s law background primarily based on French law and its Code de Commerce. Also, the nature of most listed companies in Greece as family owned, governed by a dominant shareholder led the legislator to adopt mandatory rules in order to restrict investors" expropriation. In the same sense, it is noted by Enriques and Volpin
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, that private contracting and social norms instead of regulation are not enough for protecting the expropriation of investors by dominant shareholders.
In both regimes (Greek and Cypriot) the role of directors has been re-examined. Currently, in case of every direct or indirect interest of directors or conflict with the company"s interests they are obliged to disclose this information and avoid any involvement in the transaction. A fundamental addendum to both regimes is the provision of independent directors on the board and in Cyprus the percentage is even higher, as the CCGC requests half of the board of companies listed in the CSE to consist of independent directors. Furthermore, the role of shareholders was enhanced in both regimes; in Greece rather recently, by the new company law 3604/2007 and not by the Act, and in Cyprus through the CCGC. Companies allow now remote voting through electronic mechanisms (such as Internet and telecommunication technology). Also, there is a written provision in the Greek law 3604/2007 that every shareholder has the right to request daily information about the company and not the 1/20 of the capital as the case was in the past. However, there should be given more incentives to the shareholders to participate regularly in the general meetings and this is not provided for by any written provision in none of the countries examined. In addition, both countries adjusted their legislation to European disclosure and transparency regime through the implementation of specific directives. On the other hand, little has been done for strengthening public enforcement and for introducing tools of private enforcement. The competent authorities of both countries have a wider power now in imposing sanctions, but private enforcement as a whole, differently from the US, is in its infancy in Europe.
The American example of class actions is far from being applied in Greece or in Cyprus 110 . Both regimes show adjustment to the reforms that take place at an international and European level 111 .
The new proposal of law in Greece containing the comply or explain rule for the compliance with a corporate governance code in the annual corporate governance report shows an adjustment to a more Anglo-Saxon environment by convergence. The data analysed in a previous relevant research by Tsipouri and Xanthakis 112 shows that Greek companies demonstrate a fairly satisfactory degree of compliance with the corporate governance framework. Adoption of more demanding and less binding corporate governance standards seems to be a relatively unknown practice in Greece. Greek firms might not be yet "convinced" of the merits of corporate governance and still face it as an unavoidable cost 113 . But this should be another implication of a healthy corporate governance regime; not only should corporate governance mechanisms be implemented but this implementation should be made known to the investors. And it might be that the disclosure and the information in Greek market is still lacking.
On the contrary, Greece is one of the few countries where Greek listed companies must pay a percentage of their earnings to their shareholders. As reported by La Porta et others 114 , Greek listed companies have to pay 35 per cent (35%) of their earnings to shareholders as dividends and this is the second highest payout ratio in a research sum of 49 countries. For this reason and for several other specific reasons related to a specific country or firm (such as : level of regulation, government ownership, life cycle of the firm, the balance of power between capital and labour etc.) it might be that Greek firms diverge from the national and, particularly, international guidelines as noted by Florou and Galarniotis
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. However, in Greece one should seek currently to evaluate the effectiveness of the new company law concerning shareholder rights in combination with every other enough, not to mention a little vague, but with the support of actual enforcement could lead to a better market efficiency, in a way of protecting investors and assuring the optimal allocation of capitals. Consequently, there is no need for more regulation; self-regulation can elaborate the obligatory rules set by the Corporate Governance Act in Greece and motivate shareholders. Staikouras shares the opinion that soft law and self regulation rather than conventional lawmaking -channels (e.g. Acts, Presidential Decrees and Delegated Legislation) is better suited to reflect the "one does not fit it all' character of accepted corporate governance practices 121 . Indicative of the new trend is the adoption of the Greek legislator of the "comply or explain rule" in the annual report of corporate governance of the firm concerning the compliance (or not) with the corporate governance code. On the other hand, in Cyprus the basic provisions of the Company law, as regards the BoD structure in accordance with the CCGC, provide the companies with the option to become more competitive and to seek benefits from their being listed in such a liberal trading market. When Lannoo notes 122 that it is an illusion to believe that there could be a regulatory pause in financial markets and as the industry "s capacity to innovate and develop is almost unlimited, there will always be a need for regulators to react to the changes, not to mention the regulatory need that has arisen after the current financial crisis.But before reaching to new regulation, self-regulation and self-commitment of the companies to principles and the rise of healthy competition in financial markets could be a step forward. Self-regulation can result in cost efficiency for medium and small sized companies, whereas it does not importantly affect larger ones 123 . Since Greek and Cypriot companies are medium sized in general, self-regulation might be the key for a better corporate governance, more effective in practice that could drive to a stronger competition and maximize the firms values. Both markets show willingness to respond to the current trend of corporate governance and adjust to the modern markets needs. It is an interactive process between regulators, companies and market players and it is subject to change as long as the needs change too.
In conclusion, the evaluation of both frameworks reflects the legal origin of each country but it should now be focused more on the enforcement instruments rather than on acquiring new regulation or requesting for more self-regulation.
